Antimony for Defence and Solar: Where Gilgit-Baltistan Sits in the NATO Supply Picture

China set the antimony export licence regime on 15 September 2024. Western traders I speak with are still recalibrating, and most of them hadn't thought seriously about Pakistan as a source until that week.

I'll be direct. We've had more inbound enquiries about antimony in the last six months than in the previous three years combined. Buyers from Rotterdam, two Japanese trading houses, a US defence prime through an intermediary, and a German solar glass manufacturer. None of them were on our radar before Beijing tightened the screws.

So let me lay out what we actually have in Gilgit-Baltistan, what the geology says, and where this fits into the allied supply picture for defence and solar.

What's actually in the ground

Antimony in GB occurs primarily as stibnite (Sb2S3) in quartz vein systems associated with the Karakoram and Kohistan terranes. We're working two concessions with confirmed stibnite mineralisation — surface sampling from one of them returned grades between 8.4% and 31.7% Sb across a strike length we've mapped at roughly 1.2 km. That's not unusual for vein-hosted stibnite. The high-grade pockets are real but the average mineable grade across a bulk sample will sit lower, probably in the 4–7% range based on what we've seen so far.

For context, the Xikuangshan mine in Hunan — still the world's largest antimony operation — runs on grades that have declined to around 2% Sb over decades of mining. Tajikistan's Anzob averages 1.2–1.5%. So the GB occurrences are competitive on grade. The question isn't whether the metal is there. It's tonnage, infrastructure and processing.

We haven't done the drilling yet to call a JORC or NI 43-101 resource. I won't pretend otherwise. What we have is surface mapping, trenching, and rock chip assays from an ALS lab in Islamabad. A serious JV partner would be funding the drill programme — that's the conversation we're ready to have.

Why the demand side changed

Antimony isn't a glamorous metal. Most people couldn't tell you what it does. But it sits on the US Geological Survey critical minerals list, the EU critical raw materials list, and the UK list. It's a NATO-relevant strategic material. Here's why that matters right now.

Defence applications first. Antimony trisulfide is the primer compound in small arms ammunition — billions of rounds a year. It hardens lead in armour-piercing cores. It's used in night vision (as an infrared detector material), in flame retardants for military uniforms and vehicle interiors, and in tracer ammunition. The US Defense Logistics Agency has been quietly rebuilding its National Defense Stockpile of antimony since 2021. They're buying.

Solar is the bigger volume story. Solar-grade antimony goes into the glass of photovoltaic panels — antimony oxide improves the glass clarity and reduces solarisation (the gradual darkening of glass under UV exposure). Roughly 0.2–0.3% of the glass weight. Sounds small until you multiply it by the 450+ GW of solar capacity the world installed in 2023. First Solar, Jinko, Longi — they all need it. And with China now requiring export licences on antimony products, the Western and Japanese solar supply chain is exposed in a way it wasn't 12 months ago.

Honestly, I used to think antimony was a niche we'd address eventually, after copper and gold. I was wrong. The shift in 2024 changed the priority order.

Where Pakistan fits — and where it doesn't yet

I want to be measured here. Pakistan is not going to replace China on antimony. China still produces roughly 48% of global mined antimony and controls a larger share of refining. What Pakistan — and specifically Gilgit-Baltistan — can do is contribute to a diversified, allied-friendly supply basket alongside Australia (Mandalay's Costerfield), the restarted US operations, Bolivia, and Turkey.

For a NATO-aligned buyer or a Japanese trading house, even 2,000–4,000 tonnes per year of antimony concentrate from a non-China, non-Russia source is strategically valuable. That's the scale we think a developed operation in GB could reach within 36 months of a funded JV. Not 50,000 tonnes. But meaningful tonnage in a tight market.

Licensing sits with the Gilgit-Baltistan Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority and the Department of Mineral Industries. Our concessions are held under exploration licences with the right of conversion to mining lease on resource definition. Export of antimony concentrate from Pakistan does not require the kind of licence regime that China just imposed — and that's a point worth making clearly to off-take buyers who are tired of regulatory whiplash.

Logistics. This is the honest part of the conversation. Concentrate moves by road from GB down the Karakoram Highway to Karachi or Port Qasim — that's roughly 1,800 km. It's not a trivial haul. We've costed it at around USD 95–110 per tonne to port depending on season and fuel. From Karachi, you're 14–18 days to Rotterdam, 10–12 to Shanghai, 8–10 to Jebel Ali. The KKH is paved end to end and there's also the option of routing through Sost into Xinjiang for buyers who want that, though most Western off-takers prefer the Karachi route for obvious reasons.

What a serious conversation looks like

If you're a trading house or a defence-adjacent buyer reading this, the conversation we want to have is concrete. Drill programme funding in exchange for off-take rights at a defined discount to Rotterdam MMTA Standard Grade II pricing. Or an equity JV at the concession level with a clear path to mine development. We're not interested in NDAs that go nowhere or speculative tyre-kicking — we've had enough of those calls already this year.

The antimony market is going to stay tight. Look at the price chart from January 2024 to now if you don't believe me — Rotterdam standard grade moved from around USD 12,500/t to north of USD 25,000/t in nine months. That's not speculative froth. That's a structural supply problem that Western and allied industry has to solve.

We're one piece of that puzzle. A small piece, but a real one.