China's Export Controls Just Made Pakistani Antimony and Tungsten Worth a Serious Look

September 15, 2024. That's the date Beijing's antimony export controls took effect. By early 2025 antimony trioxide had passed $39,000 per tonne on some Rotterdam deals, up from around $11,000 a year earlier. Tungsten APT followed a similar arc after the February 2025 controls widened.

And the phone started ringing.

I'm not going to pretend Pakistan is about to replace China. Nobody is. China still controls roughly 48% of global antimony mine supply and something like 80% of tungsten. What's changed is that buyers in Stuttgart, Nagoya and Dallas aren't asking for a full replacement anymore — they're asking for a second source that isn't Russian, isn't Tajik through Chinese offtake, and isn't going to get pulled out from under them the next time a licence application sits on a desk in Beijing for six months.

That's a different question. And it's one we can actually answer.

Where the Antimony Sits

Our antimony work is concentrated in the Chilas and Kohistan belt, with a secondary target zone in Krakar. Stibnite is the primary sulphide — nothing exotic, coarse-grained, hand-sortable at the vein where the assays run high. We've had channel samples come back at 12.4% Sb with individual grab samples pushing past 30%. That's not the average across the concession, and I want to be honest about that. The average across mapped strike is closer to 3.8% Sb, which is still commercial-grade for direct-shipping ore or basic gravity concentrate.

Here's the thing about antimony that a lot of investors miss. The metal itself is a small market — maybe 140,000 tonnes a year globally. But it's a chokepoint mineral. You can't make flame retardants for EV battery casings without it. You can't make lead-acid battery grids at scale without it. And critically for the defence buyers I've been talking to, you can't make armour-piercing ammunition primers or night-vision hardware without it. The US Defense Logistics Agency has been quietly rebuilding its stockpile since 2023 and they are not shy about who they'll talk to.

For a Pakistani operation, the economics look like this. Getting to 60% Sb concentrate through gravity plus flotation is achievable on-site. Trucking to Karachi runs us roughly $95 to $110 per tonne depending on the season and whether the Karakoram Highway is behaving. From Karachi to Rotterdam or Shanghai you're looking at container rates that, even at current levels, leave a very healthy margin against $30,000+ metal.

That margin is what makes the JV conversation interesting. We're not selling desperation.

Tungsten Is a Different Animal

Our tungsten showings are in the Karakoram batholith contact zones — scheelite mostly, some wolframite where the pegmatites cut through older metasediments. Scheelite fluoresces under UV, which sounds trivial but it's how we've been doing rapid field verification on new showings before spending on assays. Cheap and it works.

Grades on the two most-developed prospects are running between 0.42% and 0.71% WO3, with narrow high-grade shoots hitting 1.8%. For context, the global average mined grade is around 0.35% WO3. So we're above average, but not spectacular — and I'd rather tell you that than have you find out from your own consultant.

What makes the tungsten story work isn't the grade. It's the geopolitics. When people talk about antimony tungsten alternatives to Chinese supply, the honest list is short: Vietnam (Nui Phao, one mine essentially), Bolivia (small, chaotic), Portugal (Panasqueira, aging), Rwanda (concentrate quality issues), and then you're into projects that are five to ten years from production. Australia has deposits but development timelines are Australian development timelines.

Pakistan can move faster than Australia. That's just true. Our licensing at the GB Directorate of Minerals runs on a different clock, and the concessions are already granted — we're not waiting on tenement approvals. What we're negotiating is offtake structure and processing capex.

What Buyers Actually Ask Me

Honestly, the first question is always the same. Is it safe. Can we get people in. Can we get product out.

Gilgit-Baltistan isn't the security picture people assume when they think "northern Pakistan." It's a tourist region — Chinese engineers, European climbers, Japanese trekking groups. The KKH is open essentially year-round with weather-dependent closures in December-February. Karachi port is 1,750 km south and the corridor works. We've moved jade blocks on it for years without drama.

Second question is usually about the money side. Can dollars come out. Yes — the State Bank framework for mineral export proceeds is functional, and we've structured previous deals with Dubai and Hong Kong intermediary banking where buyers preferred that. Not ideal for everyone but it exists.

Third question, and this is where I got things wrong at first, is about technical due diligence. I used to send buyers our own assay reports and wonder why the conversations went cold. Now we do it properly. SGS Pakistan or Intertek for umpire assays, buyer's own geologist on-site for verification sampling, JORC-aligned resource statement in progress on the two lead antimony blocks. If you're spending $40 million on a JV you don't want a founder's word for it. You want a lab in Perth or Vancouver.

The critical minerals diversification conversation isn't hypothetical anymore. Every industrial buyer I've spoken to since October has a board mandate to reduce China concentration on specific line items by specific percentages by specific dates. Antimony and tungsten are near the top of most of those lists.

So the question I'd put back — what does your 2027 supply picture look like if the next round of controls tightens further?