Defence Procurement and the Antimony-Tungsten Squeeze: A 2025 View from Gilgit-Baltistan

Antimony trioxide was trading around $39,000 a tonne last week. Two years ago it was $11,500. That single number tells you almost everything you need to know about where defence procurement teams are heading in 2025.

And tungsten APT isn't far behind — north of $360 per mtu and still climbing on the back of Chinese export controls announced in February.

I run GBX Resources out of Gilgit-Baltistan. We hold 16 concessions across the region, and two of them — one antimony-bearing block near Chilas and a stibnite-scheelite occurrence we've been sampling in the Astore valley — have suddenly become the most-called numbers in my phone. Buyers who ignored us for three years are now asking for site visits within the fortnight.

So let me walk through what's actually happening, from the perspective of someone sitting on the rock.

Why defence buyers can't sleep on antimony anymore

Antimony goes into armour-piercing ammunition primers, night-vision equipment, infrared sensors, hardened lead for shot, and the flame retardants inside every military-spec electronics housing. It's also in the tri-iodide detonators used in certain munitions. There is no serious substitute for most of these applications — people have tried, and the performance drop is unacceptable when the end user is a soldier.

Here's the supply picture that keeps procurement officers awake. China produced roughly 48% of global antimony in 2024. Russia and Tajikistan together account for another 25% or so. Myanmar chips in maybe 8%, and it's a mess. The US produced zero tonnes of primary antimony last year. Zero. The Stibnite Gold Project in Idaho is progressing but first pour is 2028 at the earliest, and that's if permits hold.

Then came September 15th, 2024 — China's Ministry of Commerce restricted antimony exports on dual-use grounds. In December they went further and effectively banned shipments to the US. The Defence Logistics Agency's National Defence Stockpile has been trying to buy antimony metal on the open market since. Good luck.

This is the structural gap. Not a cycle. A gap.

Tungsten is the quieter crisis

Everyone's fixated on antimony because the price move is loud. But tungsten is arguably worse if you're a defence buyer.

Tungsten carbide is the standard for armour-piercing penetrators (kinetic energy rounds), the heat shielding in hypersonic vehicles, machining tools for every jet engine part, and rocket nozzle throats. China controls about 82% of mined tungsten and roughly 88% of processing capacity. In February 2025 Beijing added tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium to its export control list.

The US Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement — specifically the 2027 restriction on tungsten from non-allied sources for defence contracts — is now less than 24 months away. Prime contractors I've spoken to are running out of runway. Some of them are calling it a slow-motion crisis. I'd call it a fast-motion one, honestly.

Allied primary tungsten? Portugal (Panasqueira, still producing but limited). Spain (Barruecopardo). Austria (Mittersill, feeding Plansee). South Korea's Sangdong is restarting. Vietnam's Nui Phao is significant but complicated. Australia has projects but very little current output. That's the whole allied list, and none of it is close to sufficient.

Where Pakistan sits in this — the honest version

I'll be direct about what we can and can't offer, because credibility matters more than a sales pitch.

Gilgit-Baltistan sits on the same broad metallogenic belt that feeds antimony and tungsten districts across Central and South Asia. Our sampled stibnite showings in the Chilas area have returned Sb grades between 8.4% and 34% in vein material — the high end is genuinely rich, but grade continuity at depth needs drilling we haven't done yet. Scheelite occurrences at Astore have shown WO3 between 0.31% and 1.2% in surface channel sampling. These are real numbers from real assays, not brochure figures.

What we don't have yet: a proven reserve compliant with JORC or NI 43-101. Getting there needs 18 to 30 months of systematic drilling, and a JV partner who understands that defence-qualified supply chains require chain-of-custody documentation from the pit onward. I got the timeline wrong when I first started talking to buyers in 2023 — I underestimated how much paperwork the qualification process demands. I don't underestimate it now.

What we do have: legally held concessions under the GB Mineral Rules, road access via the KKH for concentrate export to Karachi (roughly 1,750 km, 9 to 12 days by bonded container), and a political environment where Pakistan is actively encouraging non-Chinese offtake for strategic minerals. The Special Investment Facilitation Council opened doors for exactly this kind of deal.

What I'd tell a procurement director in Brussels or Arlington

Strategic stockpile purchases from single-source suppliers won't cover you past 2027. The math doesn't work.

The realistic play for antimony-tungsten security of supply is a portfolio of medium-scale allied producers — 500 to 3,000 tonne per year contributors — spread across five or six jurisdictions. Pakistan can be one of those. Not the whole answer. One of six.

The partners we're talking to now are structuring deals as concessional development finance plus offtake at a floor price, with the buyer funding the drilling programme and a small pilot mill. That's the model that works when the deposit is prospective but not yet reserved. Waiting for a fully de-risked mine to appear on the market means paying spot in 2027 — and spot in 2027 is not going to be pretty.

What's your allied-sourced tungsten position looking like for FY26 deliveries? Because that's the question I'd be asking my supply team this quarter.