The US Critical Minerals List Explained: Where Gilgit-Baltistan's Concessions Fit

The 2022 USGS list names 50 critical minerals. We hold ground that's prospective for at least seven of them. That's not a marketing line — it's just what the geology of the Karakoram and the Kohistan island arc happens to contain, and what 16 concessions in Gilgit-Baltistan have ended up covering.

I'll walk through which ones matter, where we sit on each, and where I think Western buyers are still being a bit slow.

What the list actually is, and what it isn't

Quick context for buyers who haven't read the Federal Register notice in detail. The US Geological Survey publishes the critical minerals list under the Energy Act of 2020. Last major update was February 2022. The EU has its own Critical Raw Materials Act list (updated 2023, 34 materials), and the UK published its refreshed list in 2023 too. There's heavy overlap but they're not identical.

What the list means in practice: these are minerals where supply disruption would hurt the US economy or national security, and where one or two countries (usually one — China) dominate either mining or processing. Being on the list opens doors to DPA Title III funding, DoE loan guarantees, IRA-linked off-take premiums, and increasingly to allied-country sourcing carve-outs.

What it doesn't mean: that every deposit of a listed mineral is automatically bankable. Buyers still want grade, tonnage, metallurgy, and a credible route to port. Fair enough.

Now — where we fit.

The seven we're actually in the game on

Antimony. This is the one I'd lead with right now. China, Russia and Tajikistan supply roughly 87% of global mined antimony. China stopped exporting antimony metal and oxides to the US in December 2024. The DLA stockpile is thin. We have stibnite occurrences across two concessions in the Chilas–Astore corridor, with surface grab samples running between 8% and 34% Sb. Vein-hosted, structurally controlled, and the historical workings tell you the high-grade shoots are real. Drilling is what's pending. Honestly, if I were a Western defence prime sourcing flame retardants or armour-piercing ammunition feedstock, this would be the call I'd be making first.

Tungsten. Listed by US, EU, UK, Japan. Skarn and greisen-style mineralisation along the Karakoram batholith contact zones is well documented — the wider region hosts scheelite and wolframite. Two of our blocks sit on the right intrusive contact. Early days on tonnage but the geological setting is the same one that's productive across the border in Xinjiang.

Copper. Yes, copper is on the 2022 USGS list (it wasn't in 2018, which tells you something about EV demand projections). Porphyry and skarn copper across the Kohistan arc — I've written about the drill-hole context separately so I won't repeat it here. Point for this piece: a copper concentrate out of Karachi port heading to a smelter in Japan or the Gulf qualifies for friend-shoring treatment in a way Chilean or Zambian material doesn't necessarily.

Rare earth elements. Both light and heavy REEs are listed. We have alkaline intrusive and pegmatite targets under active exploration. I'm not going to overclaim — REE exploration anywhere is a 5 to 10 year story before you have a saleable product, and the separation/processing piece is the harder problem than the mining. But the host rocks are there.

Lithium. LCT pegmatites in the Shigar and Braldu valleys. Spodumene-bearing dykes have been mapped by the Geological Survey of Pakistan going back to the 1990s. We're sampling. Again — early.

Bismuth and germanium show up as by-product potential in some of our polymetallic systems. Not standalone plays, but worth flagging to a smelter that's looking at the full payable basket.

Where I think the Western buying side is still slow

Look, I've spent the last two years talking to traders, OEM procurement teams and a few sovereign-linked funds. Here's what I keep running into.

First, most Western buyers still think of Pakistan as either Reko Diq (Balochistan, Barrick) or nothing. Gilgit-Baltistan is a separate jurisdiction with its own minerals department, its own licensing regime under the GB Minerals Concession Rules 2016, and frankly a much more workable security picture than the headlines suggest. Concession titles are granted by the GB government directly. Export clearances go through the standard Pakistan Customs route via Karachi or Port Qasim, or overland via the Khunjerab Pass into Kashgar for China-bound material.

Second — and this is the bit that surprises me — buyers will sign 10-year off-takes with traders in Singapore for material that originates in jurisdictions with worse country risk than GB, but won't pick up the phone to a Pakistani concession holder. I get the unfamiliarity. But the critical minerals supply problem doesn't get solved by sourcing from the same three countries that caused it.

Third, the IRA's friend-shoring language and the EU's CRMA both create real commercial premium for non-Chinese, non-Russian material. Pakistan isn't an FTA partner with the US, but it is an allied-country source for materials processed in third countries that are. The structures exist. They just need someone to build them.

What a serious conversation looks like from our side

If you're a buyer or a JV partner reading this — what I can put on the table is concession documentation, surface sampling data with chain of custody, historical workings reports, and access for your geologists to visit site during the April–October window. What I can't do is hand you a JORC or NI 43-101 resource on day one. That's what the JV capital is for.

The minerals on the US list aren't going to come out of the ground by themselves. And the countries currently supplying them aren't going to start supplying more.

So who's actually moving?